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INTERDEPENDENCE OF PROBLEMS OF TRADE, DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Issues and Developments in the Uruguay Round of particular interest to developing countries

Position of the Group of 77 on agenda item 3, submitted by India on behalf of the States members of the Group of 77

1. The standing mandate of the Trade and Development Board to follow closely issues and developments of particular interest to developing countries in the Uruguay Round of MTNs must run its full course, especially as we are perilously close to the end of the Round, with less than two months left. It is therefore in the context of the agenda item on interdependence that it is important at this crucial juncture to indicate priorities and preoccupations of the Group of 77 with regard to the Uruguay Round. With much of the work far from complete in several negotiating groups, an insight into and a reminder of developing country concerns with regard to the evolving global package - a package which may refashion not only the international trading system but have a profound impact on the design and framework of global economic relations for the rest of this century and beyond into the 21st century - is called for. The incorporation or otherwise of these concerns will determine whether, the extent to which and at what pace development can be made to happen in developing countries. A satisfactory outcome of the Round from the point of view of the developing countries is vital for the success of their efforts towards accelerated economic growth and development and central to the success of the Round itself.

2. At the July meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee, developing countries individually and collectively made their views known on the general trends in the negotiations and the negotiating process. The following paragraphs attempt a synthesis of these views so that a total picture emerges.

3. A recurrent theme of developing countries has been that the processes and procedures adopted for decision-making at present need to be revised in such a way as to permit democratic, participative and broad-based decision-making at all stages of the negotiations. Unless developing countries can be fully and actively involved in decision-making and unless transparency and democratic consultations become a new habit, decisions arrived at would lack the moral and legal authority which can only come if the decisions are a full and free expression of the will of all participants. If developing countries are left out of the decision-making process, especially at the last crucial stage, the substantive outcome both in terms of a global package and in individual negotiating areas is bound to be unbalanced. Also, the unprecedented and constructive participation and interest shown by developing countries in the Round merits their voice being heard and their having a full say in the forging of the Uruguay Round compact. In the TNC statement made by the delegation of Brazil on behalf of the informal group of developing countries on 26 July 1990, it was categorically indicated that "developing countries will reject ... any attempt to impose upon them a pre-negotiated package agreed only by a few". It is our hope and belief that we have come at least some distance away from what the Indian Nobel laureate, the poet Rabindra Nath Tagore, called "a world which knew that the few were more than the many". Developing country participants in the Round comprise an overwhelming majority, and their democratic exercise of the right to choose and express their choices in respect of the elements of an international trading and economic order which is going to affect them in a fundamental way must be respected by those who cherish democratic values and want to evolve a balanced and healthy international trading system.

4. Another aspect which is relevant to ensuring a timely and successful conclusion of the Round between now and the Brussels meeting in December is the need to respect established mandates in each area and to work for agreed solutions to problems specifically identified in these mandates. This approach would narrow down the areas of divergence and focus political attention and negotiating energy on areas of convergence at a point when time is truly running out.

5. This Round has been unique not only because of the wide array of tasks it has set for itself and the likely impact on international sectors of production and trade but also because of the carefully negotiated equilibrium of rights and obligations as well as safeguards for developing countries that have been built into the Punta del Este Declaration which launched the Round. If this balance is tilted or if the safeguards for developing countries demolished - in spirit and in practice - in the course of the negotiations, it would constitute a breach of faith regarding solemn commitments given at the beginning of the Round. Yet it is easy to see from the vantage point of this last crucial phase of the negotiations that this has in fact already happened. Disregard of the general principles of the negotiations incorporated in part I(B) of the Punta del Este Declaration, which guaranteed the safe passage of the interests of developing countries through the negotiating process, has characterised the negotiations so far.

6. How do the developing countries see what the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, in his summing up at the meeting of 26 July 1990, called the phenomenon of linkages within and among subjects which arise from the Uruguay Round being one single undertaking. In our view it is important that balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands and that within this general guideline, specific priorities and mandates be followed. Linkages between different areas and issues which do not take into account the stipulation about differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries, about non-reciprocity of concessions made to them, and about their not being asked to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, should be eschewed. Observance of these negotiating principles would imply that developed country participants recognise that they cannot fully achieve their individual negotiating objectives in a number of areas to the extent that they would have liked, lest it adversely affect the trade and development prospects of developing country participants.

7. Developing countries have, as can be expected from such a large group of countries and in relation to such a wide range of issues, been pursuing their individual national interests but nevertheless have some common goals and objectives. They seek more liberal and more secure conditions of access for their exports into the markets of developed countries, with specific concessions being sought on tariff and non-tariff measures and strengthening of multilateral rules, principles and disciplines to reduce the incidence of or

possiblities for restrictions on or harassment of their trade. They wish to strengthen the multilateral trading system so that it protects and reinforces trade liberalisation through:

(a) Full respect for the principle of non-discrimination, including the automatic and unconditional application of MFN treatment;
(b) Effective and positive linkages between the international trading system and their development process, which would ensure substantial expansion of their exports in international markets and flexibility in their use of trade measures;
(c) Prohibition of all arrangements for restrictive market sharing or managed trade;
(d) Prohibition of any unilateral action outside the legal framework of the multilateral trading system; and
(e) Maintenance of and strengthening of an effective system for dispute settlement.

So far these objectives of developing countries have remained unfulfilled. Their developed country partners have attached low priority to market access issues and have made concessions in areas of interest to developing countries conditional on reciprocal market-opening actions by developing countries. Their focus is on rule-making where the attempt is to take away the existing rights of developing countries whilst providing themselves with greater flexibility of action to restrict and discriminate against developing country trade through proposals for selective safeguard action, despite the grave implications of such action for the viability of the trading system. In the negotiations on the new issues - TRIPS, TRIMS and services - developing countries face a series of initiatives by developed countries which pose a serious risk for developing countries. They hold the possibility of limiting their access to and raising the cost of flows of technology and international investment and preventing the development of their service sectors, all of which are critical inputs for their development. Such proposals, if implemented, would impede the participation of developing countries in international markets and further marginalise them in the international trading system.

8. The July 1990 meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee was no exception to this unhappy trend. Developing countries expressed their frustration and disappointment at the lack of substantive results and the continuation of the imbalance. In the first place, what emerged at the time

of the July meeting could not be termed a "global profile". In fact, in most areas, what emerged were compilations of differing positions, and most of the texts in the various negotiating groups did not provide a sufficient basis for further negotiations, nor did they identify common ground. It was also evident that there was no political will on the part of the industrialised countries to accommodate the specific proposals and interests of developing countries in the different areas. Asymmetries in the degree of progress sought remained in and between various groups and issues. Little more than lip service was paid to the principles of differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, and no effort was made at all to translate this principle into concrete operational obligations and commitments. The remaining few weeks of the Round present a daunting challenge to negotiators both in terms of the sheer quantity of work that needs to be completed in the short time and in terms of the exertion of political will that would become necessary if negotiating stances have to evolve from their present entrenched positions.

9. If success is to be achieved in the Round, it would have to be ensured that the capacity and opportunities for a measurable increase in the share of developing countries in international trade and for their accelerated and sustained economic growth and development are significantly enhanced. Also there must be recognition of the sovereign right and the need of developing countries for flexibility and autonomy to decide on their own economic policies. It would only be on this basis that a balanced expansion in the rights, obligations and benefits for all participants can be achieved. Negotiations must also get down to the task of incorporating the principle of differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries in the outcome of each of the negotiating areas, taking fully into account the ideas and proposals which developing countries have put forward with regard to this principle in the different negotiating areas. Given the complex and varied agenda of the Round and the implications for the development prospects of developing countries, it would not do to merely replicate "the best endeavour" type of provisions of Part IV of GATT and some of the Tokyo Round codes. Instead, operationally effective commitments relating to the development dimension, structurally integrated in the negotiated outcome of the Round, would be necessary. It would also mean that the disciplines and frameworks evolved must be such that developing countries would not find their interests harmed by becoming party to such arrangements.

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10. The extent to which countries were willing to fulfil their standstill and roll-back commitments during the period of the negotiations is a barometer of the credibility of the trade liberalisation commitment embodied in the Uruguay Round. The record in this regard is disappointing. Some major trading partners have not only failed to roll back protectionist measures but have also violated the standstill commitment by putting new protectionist measures in place. We hope that, at least in this last lap of the negotiations, participants will seek to impart credibility to their determination to halt and reverse protectionism by notifying measures which they are prepared to roll back by the deadline of 15 October 1990. Such notifications should indeed be of those measures whose roll-back would mark significant steps towards liberalisation.

11. Developing countries have attached special importance to obtaining a substantial package of concessions on the market access issues, especially as these concessions would promote trade liberalisation, effectively expand the opportunities for developing country exports into world markets and improve their terms of trade in the long run. Gains in these areas is one of the main reasons why developing countries have joined the Round. The special status of developing countries has been recognised in these, as in other areas, but in practice and in violation of negotiating principles, developing countries are being asked to make contributions disproportionate to their capacities.

12. Tariff negotiations, traditionally the key issue and raison d'être of GATT rounds, have been tied down by a cumbersome offer-and-request procedure. This procedure has tended to insulate tariff protection on products of priority interest to developing countries and to increase the scope of demands for reciprocity being made on developing countries. Developed countries have attached conditionalities to their tariff offers and have not addressed developing country requests for liberalisation of products of critical importance to them. It has also become evident that the commitment to give credit and recognition to participants which, since the launching of the round, have undertaken autonomous tariff liberalisation measures (this is particularly true of developing countries in the last few years) has not been respected. This situation, together with requests to reduce currently applied rates rather than the base rates as agreed in Montreal, not only disrespects the said commitment but, in fact, penalises countries whose only "mistake" was to liberalise before the end of the Round. Developing countries have made significant tariff liberalization offers for which they deserve credit and

recognition, and their request for tariff liberalization on products of their interest should be addressed seriously. Developed countries should positively review their position vis-à-vis these matters and not insist on reciprocal contributions incompatible with the trade, development and financial needs of developing countries.

13. The importance of arresting the incidence and proliferation of non-tariff measures, which constitute a major hazard and impediment for developing country exports into developed country markets, cannot be overstated. Unless the capacity of Governments in industrialised countries to impose a wide complexity of non-tariff measures is checked, the benefits of trade liberalisation in other areas cannot be secured and in fact would be severely jeopardized. In the negotiations on NTMs, many matters await resolution. The fundamental issue of an agreed perception or definition of which NTMs are GATT-consistent or otherwise is still pending. Developing countries hope that developed countries are not preparing to ask the developing countries to pay for removal of measures which are of doubtful consistency with GATT and which should in any case have been phased out as part of the roll-back process. Recognition of such roll-back shall in any case be given as agreed at Montreal.

14. The Punta del Este Declaration accorded special priority to the fullest liberalisation of trade in tropical products and singled out this area for early implementation of results because of the importance of tropical product exports for the economies of many developing countries. However, apart from the minimalist and symbolic offers at the Montreal mid-term review meeting, developed countries have not moved forward. Developing countries with a major interest in export of tropical products have found that developed country offers were inadequate in terms of depth of tariff concessions and ignore products of export interest of them. Another problem is that in this critical area of export interest to developing countries too, developed countries are demanding reciprocal concessions. Some developed countries are refusing to make their offers more specific and are even threatening to scale them back unless developing countries are more forthcoming in their contributions. Also, progress in this area has become tied down to a resolution of differences between two major participants on agriculture. Removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers with regard to tropical products exported by developing countries should be given the priority that it deserves, so that one important element of balance as far as developing countries are concerned would be in place at the end of the Round.

15. Trade liberalisation within the Uruguay Round would have little meaning if one of the sectors which has been bound down by a web of restrictions derogating from the basic principles of GATT - the textiles and clothings sector - is not released from such restrictions and reintegrated into GATT after nearly 30 years. Textiles and clothing is one of the key areas in the Uruguay Round for most developing countries, not only because they have export supply capability and comparative advantage in this sector but also because it is one of the few manufactures exported by developing countries. The deadlock over adopting a single modality for the phase-out of the restrictions has not been settled, even at this late stage. ITCB has put forward a detailed proposal suggesting a MFA-based modality for integration of trade in this sector into the GATT. On the other hand, the proposals of major industrialised importing countries have been based either on a global quota or tariff quota system or on a parallelist approach which demands that developing countries "open their markets" and that the importing countries be allowed to resort freely to safeguard, anti-dumping and patent rights protection action. Meaningful progress in this area of negotiations is a litmus test for both trade liberalisation and the accommodation of developing country interests in the outcome of the Round. Textile-importing developed countries should therefore be prepared for the necessary structural adjustments and demonstrate the political will to dismantle the protectionist system which has unfairly blocked developing country access to their markets and for which their own consumers have had to pay such a high price.

16. Developing countries support greater liberalization of trade in agriculture by increasing access to markets and by substantial reduction in internal support for and elimination of export subsidies and all derogations deriving from waivers and protocols of accession of developed countries. The final aim of this process is to achieve the integration of agriculture into GATT. For developing country exporters of agricultural products, liberalisation of agricultural trade is of crucial importance. Developing countries once again emphasize the development dimension in agriculture and the special role that agriculture plays in a developing economy and seek flexibility and autonomy in the use of all measures relating to internal support programmes, export subsidies and border measures. The net food-importing developing countries need measures to be in place to offset the burden arising from an increase in food prices in the short and medium term on account of reduction and/or elimination of subsidies by major food exporting countries. Participants have agreed to intensify their efforts to break the

impasse in the negotiations in this area. Developing countries look forward to obtaining progress in the overall liberalisation of trade in agricultural products through effective application of GATT rules and principles, including that of differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries.

17. The negotiations to achieve the fullest liberalisation of trade in natural-resource-base products, including their semi-processed and processed forms, have been paralysed due mainly to the totally illegal and unacceptable demand of some developed country participants for concessions on "access to supplies" of natural resources of developing countries. This demand goes against the very letter and spirit of the mandate and should be dropped. Unless progress is recorded on the reduction or elimination of tariffs, especially tariff escalation and non-tariff measures on natural-resource-base products such as fisheries, the outcome of the Round would offer little benefit to a large number of developing countries.

18. In the context of rule-making issues, developing countries have supported a strengthening of the GATT rules and disciplines so as to clarify and resolve the shortcomings that have arisen in the interpretation of the rules of the GATT system, and provide greater security and predictability in their application and in their compliance. However, the outcome in these areas must be balanced and must benefit all participants, especially the less developed and weaker trading partners.

19. Nowhere has the attempt to deprive developing countries of their rights under GATT and set aside their special needs and interests been more evident than in the move of some developed countries to review GATT Article XVIII, especially its Section B. They have thus sought to abridge or deny the right of developing countries with balance-of-payments problems of a structural and persistent nature to exercise necessary flexibility in trade policies. Developing countries would like to reaffirm that such a move has far-reaching negative implications for them and is totally unjustifiable at a time when the need of the developing countries to invoke it has increased, not decreased. If developed countries persist in their attempts to render developing countries defenceless, the multilateral trading system will clearly be perceived by developing countries as one which is hostile to their interests. In the negotiations on GATT Articles, participants should concentrate on reviewing those Articles which improve the efficacy and integrity of the GATT system and not use the pretext of such a review to alter Articles such as Article XXVIII(B) which are an integral part of the contractual framework of

rights and obligations under the GATT and which provide an assurance to developing countries that they will be able to safeguard their interests. It would therefore be advisable and in the overall interest of the Round that these discussions on Article XVIII(B) be closed.

20. Despite some forward movement, progress in the area of safeguards continues to be stalled on account of the vexed question of selectivity. Developing countries have attached priority to a comprehensive Agreement on safeguards which reaffirms the MFN principles and outlaws grey area measures. It is because of this that developing countries have opposed "selectivity" and have resisted attempts to legitimise some form of discriminatory safeguard action against exports from "selected countries". Selectivity is the very antithesis of all that GATT stands for, and any trade liberalisation resulting from the Uruguay Round could well find itself thwarted or set at nought by discriminatory restrictions against specific suppliers or perpetuation of grey area measures. Also, selectivity would hit the most vulnerable trading partners, the developing countries. It is not too late even now for developed countries to clear the way for a truly non-discriminatory and comprehensive safeguards Agreement.

21. With regard to MTN agreements and arrangements, the objective of improving, clarifying and expanding, as appropriate, the entire range of agreements and arrangements or codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round means that in respect of developing countries the obstacles to their effective participation should be removed, that they be made less restrictive and that difficulties in the implementation of these agreements be effectively addressed. Much work has been done in respect of the instruments relating to technical barriers to trade, import licensing, government procurement and customs evaluation, but care needs to be taken to ensure that more restrictive features from the point of view of the interests of developing countries do not find their way into the revisions. But it is the draft of the new anti-dumping code which has for developing countries the most significant implications. Developing countries have found the draft legal text presented before the July 1990 meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee grossly unbalanced, incorporating as it does proposals to add considerably to the wide array of protective instruments that could be used under the garb of anti-dumping measures. Proposals for addressing alleged circumvention of anti-dumping measures applied on products by way of assembly or completion of parts and components thereof have raised serious concerns in many developing

countries about their anti-development and anti-investment nature, given the interlinkages of global manufacturing operations. Developing countries would like the revised anti-dumping Code to result in a reduction of the trade barrier and harassment effect of anti-dumping investigations, and establish transparent and strict injury determination criteria, a fair methodology to calculate the margin of dumping, market-share and dumping-margin de minimis provisions and effective mechanisms for the review of anti-dumping decisions. Also, the Code should not itself become the source of renewed protectionism after the Uruguay Round.

22. Developing countries have two basic concerns in the negotiations on the improvement of GATT disciplines relating to all subsidies and countervailing measures that affect international trade. They have advocated stricter disciplines on the use of countervailing measures so as to ensure that such measures are not used as instruments of trade harassment and protection. Secondly, they wish to protect their interests in the definition of the scope of prohibited, actionable and non-actionable subsidies and specifically seek incorporation of provisions relating to special and differential treatment for developing countries in these disciplines. The draft text of the July 1990 meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee does not as yet suggest provisions relating to special and differential treatment for developing countries, and the latter are apprehensive that attempts will be made to undermine or circumscribe whatever flexibility they currently have on the use of subsidies for economic development purposes. Developed country proposals to expand the scope of what could be prohibited subsidies and of countervailable subsidies are seen by developing countries as attempts at constraining their capacity to take measures for meeting legitimate development needs. Any satisfactory conclusion of the work of this group can only be based on a recognition that, on one hand, developing countries will continue in the foreseeable future to need to maintain subsidies for development purposes and on the other there is need for clear-cut rules on countervailing measures to ensure a fair and equitable trading system.

23. Developing countries believe that a fair and effective dispute settlement mechanism is an indispensable component of a multilateral trading system. They would like to ensure that, lacking as they do the capacity to redress their trade grievances through bilateral interaction, the multilateral dispute settlement system would guarantee that their rights are protected and respected by all contracting parties. They also see it as a means of pre-empting the kind of unilateral and bilateral action by some major trading

partners that was in evidence during the course of the Round. There has been considerable strengthening of the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures agreed to at the mid-term review. In a system which relies heavily on trade retaliation, and given the fact that the developing country capacity for trade retaliation is disproportionately lower than that of their developed country trading partners, developing countries have to be given strengthened access to compensation as a means of encouraging the implementation of panels' rulings. Strengthened procedures concerning the implementation of recommendations and rulings of panels need to be evolved. Experience indicates that panel findings directed against major trading nations are often either not accepted or compliance is delayed.

24. In the new areas, developed country proposals go far beyond the agreed mandates and show no sensitivity for the development needs and interests of developing countries. Also, developed countries have sought far-reaching results in these areas, whilst progress continues to be held up in the area of trade in goods. Developing countries have participated constructively in the negotiations on the new areas and come forward with proposals in each of them. They expect that their proposals, which strictly adhere to the mandates, could be the basis for an agreed result and that developed countries will not thrust upon them their own perception of an outcome on international trade in services, TRIPS and TRIMS.

25. On TRIPS, as we move towards the most intensive phase of negotiations, the differences between developing countries and developed countries can only be bridged if the outcome is made compatible with the special technology and development needs and objectives of developing countries. Developed countries have to recognise that the interests of the intellectual property right owners can only be pursued in the context of and in harmony with their obligations towards resource and technology needs and considerations of public policy and development objectives underlying national systems of intellectual property of developing countries. They must also admit the fact that the level of intellectual property protection required by a country must be calibrated according to the stage of development of the country concerned. Also, any framework on intellectual property right protection would have to address the question of access to technology by developing countries. Whether it is a question of principles or norms and standards or the implementation of results, nothing should be done which is detrimental to the trade, development and financial needs and interests of developing countries concerned.

26. The proposals of developed countries in the TRIMS Group ignore the concerns of developing countries, go well beyond the Punta del Este mandate, which was confined to addressing the trade-restrictive and distortive effects of investment measures, and suggest prohibition of such measures per se. These proposals are undisguised attempts to protect the security and increase the profitability of foreign investment without reference to the interests of host countries. Developing countries have held that their right to determine whether, to what extent and on what terms it will permit foreign investment must be preserved in order to ensure the maximum development impact of foreign investment and to counter the anti-competitive practices of TNCs. They have therefore rejected suggestions for prohibition of investment measures themselves because they wish to continue to use them for stimulating genuine industrialisation and inducing transfer of technology, managing balance of payments and generating domestic employment. They have, however, indicated their willingness to follow an "effect oriented approach" and indicated a willingness to undertake a case-by-case examination of adverse trade effects of TRIMS, if any. This, in our view, is the only realistic possibility.

27. The work on trade in services has reached a fairly advanced stage in respect of the multilateral framework of principles and rules. However, developing countries are concerned that the framework should recognise the basic asymmetry in the situation of services in developed and developing countries, because of which specific obligations would have to be included in the framework to ensure the increased participation of developing countries in international trade in services agreed to in Montreal, including through measures aimed at strengthening their domestic service sectors. These could include developing country conditions placed on access for foreign suppliers and provisions of effective and preferential market access for service exports from developing countries. There should be no right to market access, establishment and/or national treatment. Developing countries' commitments with respect to market access and national treatment would be confined to those sectors and subsectors where they would agree to specific concessions (the positive list) and that symmetry would be maintained between the treatment of movement of factors of production associated with the supply of services. Unless specific provisions elaborating these ideas are incorporated in the multilateral framework, it would merely become a device for consolidating the already dominant position of developed countries and their TNCs in the trade and production of services. The framework should instead be a dynamic instrument that would assist developing countries in developing core

service sectors and establishing a competitive position in international trade in services. In order to have a successful outcome in the GNS negotiations, it is of fundamental importance for all participants to agree as soon as possible on the universal coverage of sectors to be included in the framework and the automatic and unconditional application of the MFN clause.

28. Proposals relating to institutional arrangements to implement the results of the Uruguay Round, especially in the new areas of negotiations, TRIPS, TRIMS and services, have been made by some developed countries. In this context, the proposal to establish a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) has been mooted by one major trading entity with the objective inter alia "of establishing a legal basis for action to ensure the effective implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round, including the adoption of a dispute settlement procedure applicable to all separate multilateral trade agreements" and also "establishing a sound institutional framework for the new GATT". Such proposals clearly are not covered by the Uruguay Round mandate.

29. In the context of future institutional arrangements and strengthening of the international trading system, members of the Group of 77 would no doubt carefully consider a universal trade organization, provided it would be meaningful, broad-based, comprehensive and responsive to developing country aspirations. The Group of 77 feels that it would be necessary for such an organization to deal also with questions relating to restrictive business practices, commodities and access to technology, which are of vital importance to developing countries. Such proposals require careful and detailed preparations and are best undertaken within the United Nations system, including UNCTAD, which has a comprehensive mandate, universal membership, experience and expertise to deal with such initiatives.

29. Before the conclusion of the negotiations and in order to ensure the effective application of differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, the group of negotiations on goods is required to conduct, before the formal completion of the negotiations, an evaluation of results in terms of the principles and objectives of the Punta del Este Declaration. This evaluation, envisaged in Part I.G. of the Declaration, which should ideally have been undertaken by now, is scheduled during the first week of November. We look forward to a comprehensive evaluation which would clearly delineate the issues and areas which need to be addressed in the remaining four weeks of the Round to make the Uruguay Round outcome acceptable and beneficial to developing countries.